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Medical Malpractice: A Time for
More Talk and Less Rhetoric
by Robert M. Ackerman*

I. INTRODUCTION

In late 1984, the American Medical Association (AMA) released three
reports on Professional Liability in the 1980's.1 An early passage in the
first of these reports proclaims:
Claims and suits against physicians and hospitals have proliferated.
Settlements and awards have broken all records, with million-dollar
payouts becoming increasingly common. As a result, physicians' costs for
professional liability insurance protection have risen to extraordinary
levels in many areas, threatening to divert some physicians out of their
major specialties and barring young physicians from practicing in places
or specialties where premiums are especially high. The effect of today's
professional liability climate is to restrict patients' access to quality medical care.'
According to the AMA, a mid-1970's crisis in availability of medical
malpractice insurance now has been supplanted by a crisis in affordability.8 The AMA further reports that what was once largely an urban phenomenon has spread to rural areas as well, with all doctors viewed
as potential victims of crippling malpractice awards."
Critics of the AMA position view it as unduly alarmist. The Association
* Professor of Law, The Dickinson School of Law. Colgate University (B.A., 1973);
Harvard Law School (J.D., 1976). The author would like to thank Professor Laurel S. Terry
for her valuable assistance in editing this Article, and E. Karen Hanson, his research assistant, for her research and comments.
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of Trial Lawyers of America (ATLA), an organization composed largely of
plaintiffs' personal injury and criminal defense lawyers, contends that the
AMA is once again 'crying wolf' in the hope of obtaining special interest
legislation akin to that enacted in the mid-1970's.5 Claiming that proposals for tort reform would protect physicians at the price of a substantial
forfeiture of patients' rights, an ATLA position paper states, "There is a
medical malpractice problem. It is too much medical malpractice."'
This Article first examines the competing claims of the AMA and
ATLA with respect to medical malpractice litigation.7 The next section of
the Article explores some legal reasons for excessive exposure of physicians to malpractice liability. The balance of the Article analyzes some
possible solutions. Legislative reform proposals are divided into those
that would arbitrarily curtail patients' rights in order to reduce the threat
of malpractice verdicts and those that are designed to address the very
real problems of medical malpractice litigation. The Article considers alternative means of resolving disputes related to medical services. The Article concludes that the present atmosphere of "confusion and recrimination" is conducive to neither the enactment of fair and rational tort
reform legislation nor the amicable resolution of disputes, and that a new
climate of understanding is needed if doctors, lawyers, and patients are to
find solutions to the medical malpractice problem.

II. Is THERE A MEDICAL MALPRACTIcE CRIsIs?
By the AMA's own account, a mid-1970's crisis in the availability of
medical malpractice insurance was abated by the "enactment of some 300
different tort reform measures." These measures included, inter alia,
compulsory or voluntary use of arbitration 0 or pretrial screening panels,"
limitations on attorneys' fees, 1 modification of the collateral source

5. ASSOCIATION Op TRIAL LAwYERs OF AMERicA, THE AMERcAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION IS
WRONG--THERE iS No MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE CRsSIS 1, 8 (1985) [hereinafter cited
as ATLA REPORT).
6. Id. at 11.
7. The terminology these two groups employ demonstrates the gap between them. The
AMA prefers 'professional liability' to ATLA's 'medical malpractice.' See generally AMA
REPowr, supra note 1.
8. The words are those of Prof. Richard A. Epstein, writing in 1976. They are every bit
as applicable today. Epstein, Medical Malpractice: The Case for Contract, 1976 AM. B.
FOUND. RESEARCH J. 87, 89.
9. AMA REPORT 1, supra note 1, at 6.
10. E.g., CA. Civ. PROC. CODE 1 1295 (West 1982).
11. E.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 655, subch. II (West 1980).
12. E.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6146 (West Supp. 1985); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-9.5-5-1
(Burns 1983).
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rule,13 and shortening of statutes of limitations. 1' The AMA reports a de-

cline in the number of claims in the mid-1970's, probably as a result of
these tort reform measures.' s The doctors' organization, however, also reports growth in the size of the average claim during that period,"' followed by a surge in medical malpractice claims in the early 1980's. According to the AMA, the average incidence of claims per one hundred
physicians increased from 3.3 claims per hundred prior to 1978 to 8
claims per hundred during the years 1978 to 1983.'1 The AMA concludes
that the growth in claims (in terms of both number and size) had an impact on both the size of doctors' medical malpractice premiums and the
profitability of the medical malpractice insurance industry.8 "Between
1975 and 1983, medical liability premiums increased by more than eighty
percent in general. But in some areas of the country, harder hit by more
and costlier claims, high risk physicians were being forced to pay annual
premiums running $20,000, $30,000 and even as high as $70,000. ''19
ATLA dismisses many of the above claims. Stating that medical malpractice insurance premiums represent less than one-half of one percent
of health care costs, ATLA notes that a comparison between premium
income and claims paid "fails to mention

. . .

that a particularly impor-

tant component of profitability of malpractice insurers is investment income" 20 and, therefore, understates total insurer income. The AMA, however, suggests that some malpractice insurers are now past the point
where investment income can offset underwriting losses.21 The ATLA position paper notes instances in which doctors have successfully sued their
insurance companies for overcharging. 2s If the trial lawyers are to be believed, claims of a medical malpractice 'crisis' amount to alarmist calls for
protectionist legislation based on unreliable figures and unrepresentative
horror stories.
Indeed, some of the statistics cited in the AMA Report appear to be
13. E.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.1 (West Supp. 1985) (also precluding subrogation); FLA
STAT. ANN. § 768.50 (West 1985) (no reduction if right of subrogation exists); IOwA CODE
ANN. § 147.136 (West Supp. 1985) (partial abrogation of rule).
14. E.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-542 (West 1982) (reduced from six to three years).
15. AMA REPORT 1, supra note 1, at 6.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 10.
18. AMA figures indicate underwriting losses in excess of professional liability premiums
paid in every year since 1979. Id. at 7 (chart).
19. Id. at 8.
20. ATLA RfERT, supra note 5, at 2.
21. AMA REPORT 1, supra note 1, at 8. The insurance companies' income problems reflect at least in part a general income problem among liability, property, and casualty insurers. See Berg, Another Challenge to Insurers, N.Y. Times, July 31, 1985, at Dl.
22. ATLA REPORT, supra note 5, at 3. See also Londrigan, The Medical Malpractice
'Crisis': UnderwritingLosses and Windfall Profits, TIUAL, May 1985, at 22.
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quite selective, almost anecdotal. For example, the AMA Report cites a
Florida Medical Association survey indicating that twenty-five percent of
obstetricians/gynecologists in that state no longer deliver babies.2 3 Statistics from limited geographic areas can be misleading, especially when
they are drawn from a state in which a disproportionate number of resident physicians are retired. Recent empirical studies by Professor Marc
Galanter 24 suggest that we should take a harder look at claims of a 'litigation explosion' supported by 'atrocity stories'28 or 'war stories.' 6 The
AMA's own report indicates that "60% of the liability dollars lost arise
from approximately two percent of the cases and 70% from about three
percent. '2 7 Another source reports that one percent of all physicians who
pay premiums to Pennsylvania's Catastrophic Loss Fund account for over
twenty-five percent of all such fund's actual and expected loss payments.2 8 Caution must be exercised about making generalizations based
on anecdotal experiences of a few physicians, or upon data concerning
certain high-risk specializations or limited geographic areas.
A 1982 Rand Corporation study29 provides objective data that would
appear to support the thesis that mid-1970's tort-reform legislation at
least temporarily reduced the incidence of medical malpractice litigation.
"Since 1976," the study reports, "the frequency of claims has leveled off
and has even fallen in some states, notably those with the highest frequency in 1975. Severity has continued to increase, but less rapidly in
'
states that had relatively high awards in 1975."s
The declining frequency
23. AMA

REPORT 1, supra note 1, at 11.
24. See, e.g., Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes. What We Know and Don't
Know (and Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31
UCLA L.REv. 4 (1983).
25. That is, "citation of cases that seem grotesque, petty or extravagant." Id. at 10.

26. That is, "accounts of personal experience by business and other managers about how
litigation impinges on their institutions, ties their hands, impairs efficiency, runs up costs,
etc." Id. at 11.
27. AMA REPoRT 3, supra note 1, at 7.
28. A. HOFFLANDER & B. NvE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE IN PENNSYLVANIA 72
(1985). Hofflander and Nye report a disproportionate number of losses attributable to a
relatively small number of physicians in many areas of specialization. Id. at 88 (Table V-7).
This 'hazardous physicians analysis' strongly suggests that the reason for malpractice
awards is, in fact, malpractice. In light of this data, Hofflander and Nye suggest that "experience rating as opposed to class or even specialty rating would not only permit reduced
medical malpractice insurance premiums for quality physicians... but would also produce
economic incentive to reduce malpractice incidence overall." Id. at 84.
29. P. DANZON, THE FREQUENCY AND SEVERITY OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CLAIMs (1982)
[hereinafter cited as the RAND STUDY].
30. Id. at 2. Other significant findings of the RAND STUDY: (1) The density of lawyers'
per capita does not significantly affect claim frequency, after controlling for physician density per capita and urbanization; (2) proplaintiff changes in common law doctrines contributed significantly to the rapid growth of medical malpractice claims in some states in the
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of medical malpractice claims since 1975 would appear to reflect a general
decline in tort litigation during that time period.3 1 One must take caution,
however, not to draw too many inferences from the Rand data, most of
which the authors of the report assembled no later than 1980. As the
Rand report itself notes, claims data for recent years may be unreliable,
because of the long 'tail' on medical malpractice litigation.3 2
Given the inconclusiveness of available statistics, it is all the more important to examine the conduct that underlies the statistics, along with
the legal rules governing that conduct. ATLA's position on this subject is
clear and concise: "The cause of malpractice litigation is medical negligence. ' '3 3 Indeed, the AMA concedes that "[tlhere are legitimate instances
of medical negligence."'" Yet the AMA Report devotes very little attention to the root causes of medical malpractice, instead focusing upon the
unavailability of affordable insurance and problems within the legal system. In its "action plan to address professional liability problems," the
AMA targets four major areas for attention: (1) Education and community action (to make the public more sympathetic to the doctor's plight);
(2) legislation: state and federal tort reform and judicial reform (for
which the AMA has a number of proposals, some of which are discussed
below); (3) defense coordination; and (almost as an afterthought) (4) risk
control and quality review.35 It would appear peculiar that the nation's
leading organization of physicians should devote only one-and-one-half
pages of a sixty-four page report to that last subject.30 As one example of
the AMA's emphasis on legal problems over medical ones, the AMA report cites Harvard President Derek Bok's 1983 report, which was critical
of the legal profession 3 but does not cite President Bok's report one year
early 1970's; (3) of the post-1975 tort reforms, caps on damage awards and mandatory offset
of collateral compensation appear to have had the greatest effect. Id. at v-vi.
31. Id. at 5-6.
32. Id. at 4. This 'tail' is described by Danzon as the "lag between filing and disposition
of claims." Id. To medical malpractice insurance underwriters, the 'tail' represents the time
between conduct giving rise to a claim and the disposition of the claim. Because of the trend
toward 'discovery' statutes of limitation in medical malpractice actions (under which the
time for filing a claim does not begin to run until the patient has or should have discovered
the injury), the 'tail' on medical malpractice claims can be quite long. This has led some
malpractice insurers to begin writing policies on a 'claims made' rather than on an 'occurrence' basis. AMA REPORT 1, supra note 1, at 5.
33. ATLA REPORT, supra note 5, at 6.
34. AMA REPORT 1, supra note 1, at 23. One AMA spokesman said that "[t]he reason for
malpractice claims is malpractice." Id.
35. AMA REPoRT 3, supra note 1, at 9-16.
36. In all fairness, the AMA now appears to be taking some steps to bolster peer review.
See Brinkley, U.S., Industry and Physicians Attack Medical Malpractice, N.Y. Times,
Sept. 2, 1985, at 1.
37. Bok, A Flawed System, HAJv. MAG., May-June 1983, at 38 (cited in AMA REPoRT 3,
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later criticizing the manner in which physicians are trained,38 One cannot
read the AMA report without getting the sense that lawyers are viewed as
the true villains,39 and that the AMA's solution to the medical malpractice problem lies in an overhaul of the legal system.
The trial lawyers, at times, have similarly engaged in finger-pointing at
the expense of problem solving. ATLA literature is quick to attack medical malpractice law reform as 'special interest legislation, '" while failing
to acknowledge the substantial stake of trial lawyers in the present system of contingent fees and inflated jury awards. At times the ATLA literature portrays the medical profession in caricature; a recent article on
medical malpractice in ATLA's Trial magazine is introduced with a large
photograph of three surgeons garbed as the Marx Brothers. 1
Viewed together, the AMA's and ATLA's assessments of the medical
malpractice problem resemble ships that pass in the night. To doctors,
the problem is lawyers. To lawyers, the problem is doctors (and occasionally their insurance companies). While neither the AMA nor ATLA represent the opinions of all members of their respective professions,' the
supra note 1, at 13).
38. Bok, Needed: A New Way to Train Doctors, HARV. MAG., May-June 1984, at 32. An
excerpt from President Bok's report follows:
In a profession that emphasizes scientifically determined findings, rather than
the rough judgments characteristic of lawyers and business executives, professors
are inclined to impart knowledge didactically, as truths to be described rather
than problems to be discussed. Matters outside the domain of science command
little attention. Although everyone knows that psychological and behavioral factors can influence health, doctors have tended to regard these matters as unscientific and have left them largely to others .... It is only natural, then, for medical
schools to push such subjects to the margins of the curriculum. Similarly, since
ethical issues and patient values have little effect on the scientific determination
of disease, they have not loomed large in the thinking of physicians or faculty
committees, at least until recently, when the law courts and the media began to
make such problems too prominent to ignore.
Id. at 36. Bok goes on to cite studies indicating that despite the large number of patients
who have no physical ailments, "physicians are much more likely to overlook significant
emotional and cognitive disorders than physical ailments and symptoms" and that a distressingly high percentage of patients fail to take prescribed medicines or follow prescribed
treatment because they "do not even understand what they were told to do" due to the fault
of their doctors. Id. at 37.
39. One excerpt (from a 'roundtable' discussion): "Every [insurance] company ...
should make the plaintiffs' attorneys earn their money and make it tough to earn." AMA
REPORT 2, supra note 1, at 8.
40. ATLA REPORT, supra note 5, at &
41. Londrigan, The Medical Malpractice Crisis: Underwriting Losses and Windfall
Profits, TRIAL, May 1985, at 22-23. Groucho appears to be puffing away at his omnipresent
cigar as Chico, Harpo, and he scrub up for surgery.
42. For example, the Pennsylvania counterparts of these two organizations have begun
to work together to arrive at mutually satisfactory solutions to the medical malpractice
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rhetoric employed by these two organizations is conducive to neither the
enactment of legislation beneficial to doctors and patients alike, nor the
pursuit of less disruptive and costly means of resolving disputes. What is
needed at this stage is a dispassionate inquiry into the underlying causes
of doctors' increased exposure to liability and the development of solutions designed to address these causes in a fair and just manner. While
the underlying causes of medical malpractice problems can be traced to
medical practices and social phenomena as well as to legal problems, this
author, a lawyer by training, will focus upon the legal problems in medical disputes and some possible solutions.

III.

LEGAL BASES FoR PHYSICIANS' INCREASED MALPRACTICE EXPOSURE

One need not conclude that medical malpractice litigation has reached
crisis proportions to perceive that problems exist in the field. While available statistics may be inconclusive about the precise dimensions of the
problem, one can readily perceive that both physicians and patients have
legitimate concerns. Problems in medical malpractice are magnified by a
consideration not present in most other areas of tort law-a societal commitment to quality medical care for everyone, regardless of financial
means.4 3 This commitment has a major impact on legal standards applicable to medical malpractice cases. Doctrines such as enterprise liability
(in which costs of injuries are incorporated into the price of the product
or service regardless of fault) are inappropriate when services are viewed
as a vital entitlement regardless of one's ability to pay.'4 Similar considerations do not exist in most other fields of tort law, such as products liability. Most Americans would agree that all are entitled to quality health
care regardless of financial condition; few would find a like entitlement to
a new automobile or a new power lawn mower.
With the above consideration as a constraint, the author would like to

problem.
43. This commitment is demonstrated by public assistance programs such as Medicaid
and Medicare. One author recently commented, "An egalitarian ethic regarding access to
health services influences standards of care by requiring hospitals and physicians to adhere
to a unitary standard regardless of a patient's financial condition." Note, Rethinking Medical MalpracticeLaw in Light of Medicare Cost-Cutting, 98 HARv. L. REV. 1004, 1010 (1985).
Recent government initiatives to reduce health care costs may bring about conflict between
doctors attempting to adhere to this ethic and cost-conscious hospitals, and create a need
for new legal standards. See generally id.
44. An argument could be made that liability for defamation stands on the same footing,
due to the vital communications function played by the media and the first amendment
considerations inherent in protection of defendants in this field. See New York Times v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).

732

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37

focus upon three systemic problems that produce 'inaccurate' results4 5 in
medical malpractice cases. The first of these concerns the problem of limiting liability to negligence; the second, the problem of inflated damages;
and the third, the problem of excessive transaction costs. The author will
address each of these in order.
A. Limitation of Liability to Cases of Actual Negligence: The 'Maloccurrence' Problem
The first problem concerns the tendency of some juries to find liability
in cases falling short of actual malpractice or negligence. These cases, in
which juries erroneously equate a bad result with negligence, are sometimes referred to as 'maloccurrence' cases. 4 6 By imposing liability based
on a bad result attributable to medical treatment, notwithstanding the
exercise of reasonable care, juries in effect impose strict liability on physicians. 47 Advocates of tort law as a loss-spreading device may see little
wrong with this form of liability. 8 Indeed, a deliberate change in legal
rules under which doctors would be held liable for maloccurrences (that
is, injuries caused by medical treatment without regard to fault) might
represent an improvement over the present system, under which juries
improperly find liability for maloccurrence, in that (1) the stigma of mal45. By inaccurate results, the author means judgments or settlements in excess of or
short of that which should properly be rendered to compensate fully patients who are victims of negligence.
46. AMA REPORT 3, supra note 1, at 4. Professor Richard Epstein provides an excellent
example of one such case in his 1975 article on medical malpractice. In the unreported case
of Gail Kalmovitz, a premature infant was administered large doses of oxygen by the defendant-doctor. While this procedure may have saved plaintiff's life and/or prevented mental
retardation, it also caused a severe visual impairment. Notwithstanding the fact that defendant adhered to standard practice and probably exercised reasonable care, the jury was nevertheless prepared to award $900,000 when, ignorant of the jury deliberations, plaintiff settled for $165,000. Professor Epstein would equate plaintiff's judgment in this case to the
imposition of strict liability, and the author is inclined to agree. Epstein, supra note 8, at
114.
47. Some juries might even go a step further, holding the physician liable for forces of
nature that would have injured the patient regardless of any action (or inaction) by the
physician. In such cases, the physician is miscast in the role of an insurer, a particularly
undesirable position in light of the fact that most patients seek out physicians because they
are ill in the first place.
48. See, e.g., Justice Tobriner's concurring opinion in Clark v. Gibbons, 66 Cal. 2d 399,
419, 426 P.2d 525, 539, 58 Cal. Rptr. 125, 139 (1967) (Tobriner, J., concurring), in which he
argues:
A system openly imposing liability without any pretense of negligence ... can
insure that the burdens of unexplained accidents will not fall primarily upon the
helpless but will be borne instead by those best able to spread their cost among all
who benefit from the surgical operations in which these misfortunes occur.
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practice would not attach to the physician, and (2) there would be a more
consistent and reliable basis for the underwriting of insurance.
A rule of strict liability, however, would present some very serious
problems. First, there is the problem of distinguishing "adverse results
properly attributable to medical treatment from conditions more likely
due to the complaint which led a patient to seek medical treatment in the
first place (the 'presenting complaint')."4 9 Second, the insurance premiums necessary to support such a system would entail massive costs, which
would place medical care out of reach for many people. Neither the federal budget nor the present political climate appear to be amenable to the
assumption of these costs by the American taxpayer at this time. Third,
there is an objection to the use of the physician as the means of effectuating this loss-spreading.5
While the above objections are valid, they are not the most compelling
reasons for rejecting the strict liability approach. Strict liability should be
limited to situations when the defendant has exposed the victim to
nonreciprocal risks to which the victim has not consented.5 2 Strict liability is inappropriate in cases (such as medical treatment) in which the injured party has freely entered into the enterprise and is fully aware of the
normal risks involved.58 Unless the physician's conduct has created addi49. O'Connell, No-Fault Insurance for Injuries Arising from Medical Treatment: A
Proposalfor Elective Coverage, 24 EMORY L.J. 21, 30 (1975). See also, Epstein, supra note 8,
at 104.
50. The unacceptability of this result is discussed supra notes 43-44 and accompanying
text.
51. Professor Epstein has described this problem as follows:
[A] person who suffers sickness not cured by his physician has in principle no
claim for relief against another patient of that physician, another consumer of
medical services, or any fellow citizen. If these persons are not directly responsible
to a sick patient, why should the law seek to impose upon them responsibility to
him by indirection? ... [Eiven if it is thought that some redistribution of wealth
should take place from the healthy to the sick, there is no reason why the physician should be conscripted into service as a middleman in the process. The redistribution is erratic at best, and there are cheaper means of both public and private
insurance that allow us to achieve the stated goal at lower costs and at much
greater precision. The private tort action is a clumsy device to implement social
welfare legislation.
Epstein, supra note 8, at 104.
52. See Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 Haav. L. REv. 537 (1972).
Blasting cases provide the clearest examples of this basis of liability. See, e.g., Spano v.
Perini Corp., 25 N.Y.2d 11, 250 N.E.2d 31, 302 N.Y.S.2d 527 (1969).
53. In such cases, the patient is in effect a part of the enterprise; if enterprise liability is
to be imposed, there is no more reason to impose it on the physician than on the patient.
The public policy reasons for -the rejection of this argument in the context of employmentrelated injuries (leading to the enactment of workers' compensation legislation) are not present here. If anything, public policy favors an atmosphere in which the 'chilling effect' of
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tional risks to which the patient has not consented (that is, unless the
physician has been negligent or has failed to obtain the patient's informed consent), there is no reason to shift the loss from patient to
physician.
The preceding paragraph suggests the central role of informed consent
in the distinction between malpractice and maloccurrence. The doctrine
of informed consent requires the physician to inform the patient of the
possible adverse results of treatment, results which could arise notwithstanding the exercise of reasonable professional care on the part of the
physician. Only by discharging the duty to obtain the patient's informed
consent to treatment does the doctor remove the specter of liability for
the unavoidable bad result.6 Given the physician's superior knowledge of
possible adverse consequences of treatment, this by no means imposes an
unfair burden on the doctor. 5 One suspects that at least a few cases of
liability for maloccurrence are, in effect, informed consent cases that may
never have arisen if the doctor had fully informed the patient of the unavoidable risks inherent in the treatment to be provided."
Notwithstanding the foregoing, it is quite likely that many juries, acting out of sympathy for the injured plaintiff, a misunderstanding of legal
standards, or other motives, have found negligence in cases in which dis57
passionate observers would have found no more than maloccurrence.
Courts also have played a role in this phenomenon. In the Washington
case of Helling v. Carey," an ophthalmologist who, following standard
strict liability is not imposed on the practice of medicine.
54. In essence, the otherwise nonnegligent doctor who has failed to obtain the patient's
informed consent is held strictly liable for adverse results because the patient is no longer
viewed as a freely consenting party to the enterprise.
55. The duty does not extend to informing the patient of every possible adverse consequence; only those material risks likely to affect the patient's decision to undergo treatment
need be disclosed. Scott v. Bradford, 606 P.2d 554, 558 (Okla. 1979). The problem becomes
one of distinguishing between those risks that are significant and material enough to be
brought to the patient's attention and those that are not.
56. Miller v. Kennedy, 11 Wash. App. 272, 522 P.2d 852 (1974), affd 85 Wash. 2d 151,
530 P.2d 334 (1975), provides an excellent example of the application of the informed consent rule to a maloccurrence case. In Miller, plaintiff lost his kidney as a consequence of a
kidney biopsy. The court stated that "[a] bad result is not, of itself, evidence of negligence."
Id. at 279, 522 P.2d at 859. For that reason, the court found no error in jury instructions
concerning the absence of liability for the decision to perform the biopsy or the manner in
which it was performed. Id. at 279-80, 522 P.2d at 859. The court nevertheless reversed and
remanded the case because of error in the instruction concerning informed consent and the
doctor's failure to advise the plaintiff of the risk of losing the kidney. Id. at 290, 522 P.2d at
865.
57. There are no objective means of determining just how often this happens, although a
means of weeding out maloccurrence cases is suggested later in this Article. See infra text
accompanying notes 98-105.
58. 83 Wash. 2d 514, 519 P.2d 981 (1974).
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practice, failed to administer a simple and inexpensive pressure test for
glaucoma to a woman under the age of forty, was found negligent as a
matter of law when the patient contracted glaucoma. The Washington
Supreme Court thereby abandoned the traditional and prevalent rule
that a physician would not be held negligent if she conformed to standard
medical practice. 5 ' Professor James A. Henderson has criticized the Helling decision as an example of the abandonment of traditional rules of
law (under which the trier of fact makes relatively simple, 'linear' decisions) in favor of a more general 'reasonableness under the circumstances'
test, requiring open-ended, 'polycentric' decisions for which juries are illsuited.' 0 Henderson feels that the problem is particularly acute in those
areas, such as medical malpractice, "where an evaluation of the defendant's conduct requires an assessment of complex technology." 61
Certainly, the use of a more generalized 'reasonable doctor' standard
would reduce the number of cases in which a court could grant summary
judgment or directed verdicts on behalf of the doctor-defendants and give
juries more freedom to impose liability absent clear proof of negligence.
The allowance of conformity with custom as a defense, however, allows
the medical profession to set up a self-serving standard in which inadequate customary procedures are tolerated.' 2 Professor Richard Epstein
has observed that "the opinion in Helling v. Carey breaks no new ground
59. Id. at 519, 519 P.2d at 983.
60. Henderson, Expanding the Negligence Concept: Retreat from the Rule of Law, 51
IND. L.J. 467 (1976). Professor Henderson borrowed the term 'polycentric' from Professor
Fuller to suggest "the non-linear way in which the issues in such problems are interrelated."
Id. at 475.
Henderson, writing in 1976, was reluctant to attribute the existence of a medical malpractice crisis to this 'retreat from the rule of law.'
If a crisis does exist, it is probably caused by factors other than the increasing
willingness of courts to face polycentric problems. These factors may include a
decrease in the public trust and confidence in doctors; a growing claims-consciousness on the part of everyone in society, including medical patients; and significant
increases in the quantity of doctor-patient contact over recent years.
Id. at 491 n.67.
61. Id. at 484. Henderson believes that this generalized negligence concept also poses
serious difficulties "where an evaluation of the defendant's conduct requires defining the
contours of special relationships," and "where practical limits must be placed upon the extent of potential liability." Id.
62. The court in Helling cited Learned Hand's famous statement that:
In most cases reasonable prudence is in fact common prudence; but strictly it is
never its measure; a whole calling may have unduly lagged in the adoption of new
and available devices. It may never set its own tests, however persuasive be its
usages. Courts must in the end say what is required; there are precautions so
imperative that even their universal disregard will not excuse their omission.
84 Wash. 2d at 519, 519 P.2d at 983 (quoting The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir.
1932) (emphasis added)).
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except, perhaps, by bringing the law of medical malpractice into belated
harmony with the rest of the law of negligence." 5s Professor Epstein, nevertheless, is critical of this case, at least in part because of the manner in
which the court applied the law to the facts. Given the extremely low
(one in 25,000) incidence of glaucoma in persons under forty, Epstein observes that "[tihe court's cost-benefit analysis is clearly incomplete in
that it ignored both the probability and expected magnitude of harm and
thus the distinct possibility that even the cheapest of precautions is unwarranted."" In essence, the court's use of twenty-twenty hindsight in
the He ling case may serve as yet another example of liability for maloccurrence, this time imposed by an appellate court without the assistance
of a jury.
The Helling case demonstrates the difficulty of formulating rules that
prevent the medical profession from setting a self-serving standard, but
that also prevent juries from marching headlong into verdicts based on
maloccurrence, instead of malpractice. Greater recognition by physicians
of the uses of informed consent may result in fewer cases in which this
problem arises; some legislative and judicial means of addressing this
problem are suggested in part IV of this Article.
B. Bringing Damages Under Control
While multimillion dollar medical malpractice verdicts may be far less
commonplace than popular literature would suggest, such verdicts are not
altogether unusual."s One cannot underestimate the devastating effect of
a series of such awards on an insurance carrier, or of even one such award
on a doctor's reputation and self-esteem. Not only are the size of the verdicts important, but the disparity between verdicts in similar cases, particularly when different geographic areas are compared."
Verdict inflation is largely attributable to that component of damages
called general damages (i.e., damages for 'pain and suffering'), as distinguished from special damages (i.e., damages for out-of-pocket losses such
63.
64.
65.
award

Epstein, supra note 8, at 109.
Id.
The AMA reports that by 1978, three out of every thousand claims represented an
in excess of one million dollars. AMA REPORT 1, supra note 1, at 6.
66. See RAND STUDY, supra note 29, at 9; US. DEr. OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND Wai.FARE, RmORT OF THE SzmcirARY's COMMISSION ON MEDIcAL MuARACTIcE, 8 (1973) [hereinafter cited as HEW REPORT]. The desire that like cases produce like results derives from a
need for "predictability for firms trying to plan their business lives" and "from a sense that
inconsistency of results on similar facts is, in an abstract sense, unjust." AMEiCAN BAR
ASSOCIATION, THE SPECIAL COMMrrTE ON THE TORT LIABILITY SYSTEM, TowARmS A JURISPRUDENCE OF INJURY.

THE CONTINUING CREATION OF A SYSTEM

OF SUBSTANTIVE

JUSTICE IN

AMERsCAN TORT LAW 4-141 (M. Shapo reptr. 1984) [hereinafter cited as ABA REPORT].
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as medical care and lost wages). While special damages can be kept
within reasonable limits due to the requirement that they be supported
by proof of reasonable expenses or actual wage loss,s 7 there are no such
constraints on general damages. Juries, therefore, are free to arrive at inflated and disparate awards for pain and suffering. Juries cannot really be
blamed for this; in the absence of any standards, consistency cannot be
expected, and it is difficult to attack any figure as irrational. It is here,
however, that one finds the greatest potential for unfairly disparate treatment of defendants, crippling judgments, and inaccurate insurance underwriting. It is in the area of damages that Henderson's plea for rules of
law to avoid exposing juries to open-ended decision making might best be
applied. Some suggestions to this effect are included in part IV of this
Article.
C.

Controlling Transaction Costs

There have been frequent complaints that the transaction costs of medical malpractice litigation, in terms of both dollar expenditures and delay,
are disproportionate to the amounts recovered by victims of malpractice." The largest components of these transaction costs are the attorneys' fees expended by plaintiffs and defendants. One explanation for
high transaction costs is the complicated fact issues inherent in medical
malpractice litigation, which require prolonged discovery, employment of
expert witnesses, and lengthy trials.' Arguably, there may be some value
to subjecting people to the protracted ordeal of medical malpractice litigation. A recent American Bar Association study notes the importance of
the torts process to the vindication of personal rights7" and the legitimate
role of tort law as a 'grievance mechanism 7 1 When the adjudication process, however, causes costs that are disproportionate to the results produced, something is wrong. Excessive transaction costs can be measured
67. E.g., Seffert v. Los Angeles Transit Lines, 56 Cal. 2d 498, 364 P.2d 337, 15 Cal. Rptr.
161 (1961); Mercante v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 148 So. 2d 875 (La. Ct. App. 1963).
68. Estimates of transaction costs vary. One article cites estimates that "as little as 1820% of the total malpractice dollars actually reach the injured patient." Shapiro, The History of Medical Malpractice in the United States and its Effect upon Medical Practice,in
THE INFLUENCE OF LITIGATION ON MEDICAL PRACTCE 7 (C. Wood ed. 1977); Another source
estimates the cost of adjudication to plaintiffs at 38-45% of gross recovery, with defendants'
costs at 12% of gross recovery. Reder, Medical Malpractice: An Econornist's View, 1976
AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 511, 546.

69. "Medical malpractice cases are among the most difficult to try. They usually take
two to three times longer than other personal injury cases because of the complexity of the
requisite expert medical testimony." HEW REPowr, supra note 66, at 18. See also Epstein,
supra note 8, at 90.
70. ABA REPORT, supra note 66, at 3-1.
71. Id. at 3-16.
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not only in dollars and cents, but in the stress of the litigation process on
both doctor' 2 and patient.s Clearly, some means of containing these costs
must be found.
IV.

LEGISLATIVE REMEDIES:

SORTING OUT THE GRAB-BAG

Before suggesting some means of combatting problems in medical malpractice litigation, we should recognize that some of these problems are
not peculiar to cases of medical malpractice. As the Rand Study indicates, "malpractice experience has been more extreme than that in other
lines of tort law, but it is not unique. 7 4 Complaints regarding plaintifforiented juries, inflated judgments, and rising litigation costs have beset
the fields of products liability and defamation, to mention just two other
areas of tort law. Any discussion of tort reform proposals, therefore,
should consider whether proposed solutions to the medical malpractice
problem should be applied across the board, encompassing all cases of
personal injury. Such an analysis may also have the residual effect of
casting tort reform in terms other than special
interest legislation subject
75
to challenge on equal protection grounds.
A.

Federal Solutions

At the outset, one can dismiss as a practical present-day option the
notion of federal legislation to address the medical malpractice problem.
True, a comprehensive, federally-administered system of compensation
for injury or illness on a no-fault basis has its appeal. A system of national health insurance would provide compensation to everyone in need;
to the victim of accident or illness, it matters little whether his condition
72. "'The biggest cost ... is the emotional injury that a physician experiences ....
Decreases in physician productivity as a result of such dysfunction cannot be estimated."'
AMA REPORT 1, supra note 1, at 18 (quoting AMA Committee on Professional Liability).
73. "Personal injury cases often pit a lonely, needy, pathetic injured person against a
large, wealthy, impersonal corporate institution (either an insurance company or a large selfinsuring corporation). No other class of cases, not even criminal cases, so uniquely, as a
general proposition, involves this one-sided aspect." J. O'CoNNmJL, ENDING INSULT TO INJURY
7 (1975).
74. RAND STUDY, supra note 29, at v.
75. See Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 424 A.2d 825 (1980) (striking down a statute of
limitations provision, abrogation of collateral source rule, limitations on damages, and periodic payment provisions on equal protection (and other) grounds); see also Arneson v. Olsen, 270 N.W.2d 125 (N.D. 1978) (striking down limits on damages as a violation of equal
protection); but see Anderson v. Wagner, 79 Ill. 2d 295, 402 N.E.2d 560 (1979) (statute of
limitations not special legislation); Johnson v. Saint Vincent Hosp., Inc., 273 Ind. 374, 404
N.E.2d 585 (1980) (holding that medical review panels, limits on damages, limits on fees,
and statute of limitations provisions were not violative of equal protection).
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is the product of negligence, nonculpable physician conduct, or the forces
of nature.7 6 A system not dependent on individualized findings of fault
would reduce transaction costs substantially. It also could eliminate the
inefficiencies of the collateral source rule without the unfairness that rule
is designed to prevent." Medical malpractice/maloccurrence/illness may
be a particularly good area in which to institute a no-fault system because
(notwithstanding some earlier remarks herein) the threat of a tort verdict
is not needed nearly as much as an incentive for reasonable care in this
field as in, for example, products liability.78 At a time of massive federal
deficits and domestic belt tightening (in which even the future of the Social Security system is in doubt), however, the 7 political climate for such a
sweeping reform would not appear to be ripe. 9
Nor is substantive tort reform appropriate on the federal level. The
medical malpractice field, like other areas of negligence law, traditionally
has been reserved to the states, and federal intrusion would likely be regarded as heavy-handed and perhaps even unconstitutional. While products liability and defamation might be suitable areas for federal intervention because of either substantial interstate ramifications (in the case of
products) 0 or important constitutional issues (in the case of defama-

76. See generally Franklin, Replacing the Negligence Lottery: Compensationand Selective Reimbursement, 53 VA. L. Rav. 774 (1967).
77. Because compensation based on fault would be eliminated, a system based entirely
on first-party national health insurance would avoid the overlap of fault-based and collateral sources. (For a description of the collateral source rule, see infra note 85).
78. The author has long held (perhaps naively) the view that most physicians, due to
their personal regard for their patients, their pride in their work, and concern for standing
in the medical community, will police themselves. As for that minority of physicians who
will not, the author doubts that the threat of a malpractice verdict will teach those physicians how to perform a careful diagnosis, more effectively wield a scalpel, or better inform
their patients.
The contrast with products liability is at least in part due to the fact that the physician is
a human being with direct responsibility and personal contact with her patients, as compared with the products liability defendant, which is usually a corporation with fragmented
responsibility and little or no direct contact with the accident victim.
79. During the Great Society days of 1967 (when anything seemed possible), Professor
Marc A. Franklin wrote, "The path was. . . cleared for 'socialization' of the accident problem by the acceptance of expanded notions of appropriate government spending and a willingness to pay taxes to socialize injury and welfare costs." Franklin, supra note 76, at 784.
We have since entered an age of limits in which ambitious plans have (perhaps unfortunately) been placed on the back burner. Professor Epstein's comments in 1975 are, if anything, more in tune with today's political climate: "Incremental improvements, not messianic reforms, are the order of the day." Epstein, supra note 8, at 91.
80. Recognition of a possible federal role in products liability has prompted the introduction of a series of Congressional proposals. The latest incarnation, S. 100, 99th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1985), was rejected by committee in May, 1985.
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tion),5 ' the medical malpractice field presents neither of these rationales
for federal intervention. The marked disparities between states in terms
of the magnitude of the malpractice problem and the types of problems
that arise also suggest the use of state-by-state solutions. Medical malpractice is, therefore, an appropriate area for application of Justice Brandeis' conception of the states as laboratories of legislative experimentation.s While this philosophy may result in a lack of uniformity, little
confusion or harm is thereby generated (unlike, for example, in products
liability), and the states may learn from each other's successes and failures. As a recent ABA study states, the tort system "derives its strength
from its incremental, case-centered approach, and from its status as a 83
de'
centralized and constantly experimental feature of a federal system.
B.

Treating the Symptoms Instead of the Cause

Some of the measures proposed as cures for the medical malpractice
problem appear to be designed for the sole purpose of reducing physicians' exposure to malpractice judgments, with little regard for fairness,
logic, or the rights of patients. Proposals to arbitrarily shorten statutes of
limitation," abolish the collateral source rule," or abandon the doctrine
81. See supra note 44.
82. "It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State
may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country." New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262,
311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
83. ABA REPorr, supra note 66, at 13-1.
84. For example, a Texas statute requiring the commencement of an action within two
years from the date treatment was completed (in contrast to a more liberal and fair 'discovery' rule) was recently struck down as violating the 'open courts' provision of that state's
constitution. Neagle v. Nelson, 685 S.W.2d 11 (Tex. 1985). That statute (Tax. Rav. Civ.
STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 10.01 (Vernon 1985)) is but one example of protective legislation
that would arbitrarily deny fundamental rights to injured patients.
85. The collateral source rule prevents the trier of fact from taking into account compensation payable to the plaintiff from sources other than the defendant (e.g., the plaintiff's
own medical insurance policy). A few states have now abandoned this rule, deducting from
the judgment all forms of collateral compensation received by the plaintiff. E.g., CA. Crv.
CODE § 3333.1(b) (West Supp. 1985); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768, pt. II (West Supp. 1985) (except
where right of subrogation exists); IOWA CODE ANN. § 147.136 (West Supp. 1985) (partial
abrogation). While there is some logic to avoiding a double recovery, abandonment of the
collateral source rule penalizes those plaintiffs who have had the prudence and foresight to
make provision for certain expenses through the payment of insurance premiums. "[T]o
allow defendants to deduct collateral sources from tort judgments would clash with prevailing concepts of fairness and individual responsibility and would undermine socially valuable
incentives for self-protection." ABA RaPORT, supra note 66, at 13-16. Perhaps a reasonable
compromise has been struck by Nebraska, which allows the deduction of the proceeds of
private medical insurance at the discretion of the court, but credits the plaintiff with all
premiums paid for such insurance. NEn. Rav. STAT. § 44-2819 (1984).
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of res ipsa loquiturs (to cite only a few) strike mainly at the symptoms,
rather than at the root causes of the medical malpractice problem. Commencing the running of the statute of limitations when an injured minor
reaches the age of six or eight, 7 for example, may serve to reduce the
number of malpractice judgments against doctors, but is unlikely to provide an adequate remedy for persons of tender years.
The most prominent example of a 'reform' measure designed to address
the symptoms rather than the root causes of the medical malpractice
problem is the attack on attorneys' contingent fees. Proposals to limit or
eliminate contingent fees typify the view of many in the medical establishment that lawyers are the cause of excessive medical malpractice litigation. Ironically, an argument can be made that "the contingency fee
system makes the frivolous suit less likely,"se because:
[T]he lawyer who is paid a contingency fee ... is not likely to invest
time and several thousand dollars in out-of-pocket expenses on a case
with little prospect of success. Under the system of contingency fees, lawyers thus have the incentive to filter out capricious suits, which otherwise
would overload the courts, harass physicians and produce no social
benefits.0
Even the AMA acknowledges this possibility.s0

86. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur aids a plaintiff, unable to prove a specific negligent
act, in establishing that the defendant's conduct was nevertheless negligent. Because of the
widespread use of this doctrine in medical malpractice cases (when the plaintiff frequently
lacks the resources to prove negligence, or was unconscious during the conduct in question),
res ipsa loquitur has been a bane to many physicians who have attempted to have the
doctrine repealed or modified. Some states have required that expert testimony be used to
establish that the plaintiff's injury resulted from a failure to conform to the accepted standard of care. E.g., WAsH. Rev. CODE ANN. § 7.70.040 (West Supp. 1985). Such a formulation
does no havoc to the principle behind res ipsa loquitur, at least to the extent that the
'conspiracy of silence' (under which it was virtually impossible to find a physician to testify
on behalf of a plaintiff in a medical malpractice action) is no longer viewed as a serious
problem. However, the complete abandonment of res ipsa loquitur, as urged by some doctors, would once again place plaintiffs at an unfair disadvantage. A New Hampshire statute
(N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 507-C (Supp. 1979)), which would have eliminated the use of res
ipsa loquitur in medical malpractice cases, has been declared unconstitutional. Carson v.
Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 424 A.2d 825 (1980).
87. This proposal may be found in AMA REPORT 3, supra note 1, at 14. Statutes containing similar provisions have been enacted in a few states. E.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 16-9.5-3-1
(Burns 1983).
88. ATLA REPORT, supra note 5, at 10.
89. Id. at 10 (quoting Schwartz & Komesar, Doctors, Damages and Deterrence,298 NEw
ENG. J. oF MED. 1282, 1288 (1978)).
90. See AMA REPORT 2, supra note 1, at 18; AMA REPORT 3, supra note 1, at 6. There is
also the possibility, however, that some lawyers will accept virtually any claim, hoping that a
few long shots will come in, and more than cover their losses.
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Most of the measures that would limit attorneys' fees would set limitations on the percentage of recovery that the attorney may collect, with
the percentage allowable to the attorney decreasing as the size of the recovery increases.9 1 These limitations are calculated to eliminate windfalls
to plaintiffs' lawyers and possibly to create a disincentive to the acceptance of medical malpractice cases.2 Of course, insofar as the limitations
do pose such a disincentive, the limitations restrict plaintiffs' access to
the court system. Furthermore, insofar as these limitations apply only to
medical malpractice cases (and not toward litigation generally), the limitations are vulnerable to challenge on the basis of equal protection. It is
difficult to imagine any rational basis for distinguishing between the type
of fee allowable in a medical malpractice case from that allowable in a
products liability case, traffic injury case, or any other tort litigation."
There are, indeed, substantial problems with contingent fees; but these
problems deal largely with making the attorney's compensation commensurate with her effort and the inherent conflict of interest when the lawyer has a financial stake in her case. There is good reason to believe that
many contingent fees do in fact represent windfalls to plaintiffs' attorneys. As one distinguished commentator has pointed out: "There is little, if any, relationship between the efforts of the lawyer and the size of
the verdict, once we assume a verdict in favor of the plaintiff. The size of
the verdict is determined by the nature and extent of the plaintiff's injury
and resulting damages."" Similar problems arise out of the early settlement of cases in which the attorney has invested very little time. Assuming that interference with the contractual relationship between attorney
and client is to be allowed, 5 it might make more sense to place limitations on fees based on the hours and effort expended, rather than the
amount recovered. For example, a state might allow an attorney to charge
a percentage rate for her services, but with an upwards cap of, perhaps,
91. E.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6146 (West Supp. 1985) (placing limits on contingency fees as follows: 40% of first $50,000; 33 1/3% of next $50,000; 25% of next $100,000;
10% of any amount greater than $200,000); Act of July 2, 1985, ch. 294, 1985 N.Y. Laws
696-97 (limiting fees to 30% of first $250,000, 25% of next $250,000; 20% of next $500,000;
15% of next $250,000; 10% of any amount over $1,250,000).
92. Percentage limitations which decline as the amount recovered increases create an
incentive for plaintiffs' lawyers to agree to inadequate settlements arrived at with great
haste and little effort. While this may expedite the process and reduce total dollar expenditures, it is hardly in the patient's best interest.
93. See Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 945, 424 A.2d 825, 839 (1980). But see Roa v.
Lodi Medical Group, 54 U.S.L.W. 3340 (1985) in which the United States Supreme Court
dismissed a challenge to California's fee limitation legislation for want of a substantial Federal question.
94. Grady, Some Ethical Questions About Percentage Fees, LmGATION, Summer, 1976,
at 20, 21.
95. See Epstein, supra note 8, at 134 for criticism of this interference.
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$1,000 per hour on the amount paid.s" Such a measure would protect the
patient-client without imposing a disincentive to malpractice litigation
brought in good faith.
C.

Wedding the Solution to the Problem

The author will now turn to some possible legislative remedies to the
medical malpractice problem tailored to address those aspects of medical
malpractice litigation that produce unfair or 'inaccurate' results. While
the root causes of inflated or unfair awards may be traced back to any
number of sources,' 7 the author will concentrate on reform proposals that
address the legal problems discussed in the preceding section.
Screening Panels
The use of screening panels (typically composed of doctors, lawyers,
and laypersons) to review medical malpractice claims before they reach a
jury was advocated during the mid-1970's medical malpractice crisis and
adopted in several states." Unfortunately, in some states, this device
tended to prolong, rather than expedite, the litigation process." Indeed, if
screening panels provide nothing more than a "preliminary cantor before
the real business of trial takes place, ' 'Ios they serve little useful purpose.
If, however, they are used to narrow the issues for the jury, distinguishing
genuine cases of malpractice from those involving only maloccurrence,
screening panels composed of experts in medicine and law can have a
96. If this amount appears overly generous, consider that an attorney settling a $180,000
case after six hours of work (i.e., the time spent drafting a complaint and negotiating an
early settlement of a fairly clear-cut case) would receive $60,000 (or $10,000 per hour) for
her efforts, assuming a one-third contingency fee. Granted, many cases consume far more
time and produce less fruit, but a $1,000 per hour cap hardly shortchanges the attorney, and
it is unfair to expect those clients with good cases to subsidize the fees of those with bad
ones.
97. For example, a rights-oriented, 'entitlement'-minded society; jury sympathy for the
injured plaintiff; or enmity toward a negligent physician.
98. E.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 16-9.5-9 (Burns 1983) (submission of claim compulsory;
panel consists of one attorney, three health care providers); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 655, subch. 2
(West 1980) (submission of claim compulsory; panels are 'formal' for claims over $10,000
and consist of one doctor, one attorney, and two public members appointed by the governor;
informal panels consist of one attorney, one health care provider, and one juror from the
county where the suit has been filed).
99. Mattos v. Thompson, 491 Pa. 385, 396, 421 A.2d 190, 196 (1980) (striking Pennsylvania's arbitration panels as "impermissibly infring[ing] on the constitutional right to a
jury."); see also Aldana v. Holub, 381 So. 2d 231 (Fla. 1980) (declaring Florida's medical
mediation act unconstitutional because enlargement of jurisdictional periods, which proved
arbitrary and capricious in operation, would constitute denial of access to courts. Id. at 238).
100. Epstein, supra note 8, at 137.
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beneficial effect. The special fact problems inherent in medical malpractice cases 0 1 justify the use of medical and legal experts to make those
fact-findings for which juries are ill-suited, that is, 'polycentric' findings
as to the use of reasonable care under the circumstances.
Procedurally, the findings of a screening panel might be used in a number of ways. They conceivably could be used in lieu of jury findings, with
instructions to the jury to accept the facts found by the panel as binding.
Such a practice, however, might run afoul of the 'open courts' provisions
of many state constitutions, which guarantee the right to jury trial. 0 2
More likely to pass muster would be an arrangement under which the
panel's findings would be presented to the jury as presumptively correct,
subject to rebuttal through competent evidence.102 Alternatively, penalties might accrue to a party who persists on going forward to trial with
claims inconsistent with the findings of the panel, if the outcome at trial
is essentially in agreement with that of the panel., °" In effect, that party
could be saddled with the costs, including attorneys' fees, of a trial process that proved unnecessary.
Screening panels, therefore, can serve to rectify the first and third
problems mentioned earlier with respect to medical malpractice litigation,
involving plaintiff's verdicts based on maloccurrence and high transaction
costs. While in the past screening panels have been subject to constitutional challenge, it would appear that this challenge is best withstood: (1) when the panels tend to expedite resolution of the claim without denying access to a jury,1°5 and (2) when a rationale for disparate
treatment of medical malpractice claims (as opposed to other tort claims)
can be shown.'" The complex 'polycentric' fact-finding problems
presented by medical malpractice cases provide this rationale.
101, See supra notes 61, 69 and accompanying text.
102. E.g., IND. CONST. art. I, § 12; PA. CONST. art. I, § 11; Tax. CONST. art. I, § 13; GA.
CONST. art. 1, § 1 para. 11(a).
103, This is the current practice in Maryland. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-2A06 (1984).
104, The system could operate in a manner similar to court-annexed 'mediation' (which
more closely resembles arbitration) in Michigan. See MICH. STAT. ANN. RP 1, § 2.403 (Callaghan 1985), which provides that one party pay the other's 'actual costs' (including attorney's
fees) if the first party has rejected the mediator's evaluation, proceeded to trial, and failed
to obtain a verdict that is more favorable to him (i.e., ten percent above or below the original evaluation).
105. Compare Johnson v. Saint Vincent Hosp., Inc., 273 Ind. 374, 404 N.E.2d 585 (1980)
(holding that panels do not deny access to jury) with Mattos v. Thompson, 491 Pa. 385, 421
A.2d 190 (1980) (holding that panels unconstitutionally delay and infringe upon the right to
a jury).
106. See Johnson v. Saint Vincent Hosp., Inc., 273 Ind. 374, 393, 404 N.E.2d 585, 597
(1980) (upholding medical review panels against equal protection arguments).
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Modification of Rules Pertaining to Damages
Perhaps the best means of increasing the predictability of medical malpractice awards would be to give the court and jury more guidance concerning damages that may be awarded. The following rules are suggested:
Eliminationof Punitive Damages. Punitive damages are really an
anomaly in tort law since their function is more properly served by criminal law.107 Punitive (or exemplary) damages give juries far too great an
opportunity to vent their sympathy for an injured plaintiff based on little
or no evidentiary support and with little or no control over the total
amount awarded. Furthermore, given the formal and informal sanctions
that may be imposed by the medical profession, there is less need for
punitive goals to be served through damages in malpractice cases. 108 Because the plaintiff is fully compensated through actual damages, the elimination of punitive damages is one reform that benefits the medical profession and its insurance underwriters without short-changing injured
patients. Other reforms expressly providing for payment of the winning
party's attorneys' fees 0 s can supplant a function for which punitive damages might improperly be considered by juries. Punitive damages, therefore, should be eliminated, except in cases in which clear and convincing
evidence (or perhaps evidence beyond a reasonable doubt) establishes
that a physician has intentionally injured a patient.1 10
Limitations on General Damages. As indicated earlier, the absence of any standards for the jury to apply tends to render general damages (for example, damages for pain and suffering) speculative and unpredictable. To address this problem, several states have imposed limitations
on damages, normally ranging from $250,000 to $500,000.11
A major valid criticism of a limitation on general damages is that it
tends to treat different cases alike, imposing an arbitrary cap on the total
107. For a discussion of the role of punitive damages in tort law, see Taylor v. Superior
Court, 24 Cal. 3d 890, 901-11, 598 P.2d 854, 861-66, 157 Cal. Rptr. 693, 700-06 (1979) (Clark,
J., dissenting). See also Mallor & Roberts, Punitive Damages: Toward a Principled Approach, 31 HASTINGS L. 639, 651 (1980), suggesting that the sanction of punitive damages
should be "reserved for conduct that exceeds the bounds of normal fumbling."
108. Formal sanctions refer to suspension and revocation of professional licenses and
denial of access to hospitals. This avenue may not be a very viable one so long as medical
discipline remains a rare and inconsistent phenomenon. See Brinkley, Medical Discipline
Laws: Confusion Reigns, N.Y. Times, Sept. 3, 1985, at Al. By 'informal sanctions' the author means the drying up of referrals, professional disgrace, and similar occurrences.
109. See infra note 122 and accompanying text.
110. Punitive damages would be reserved for the type of conduct that prompted Ronald
Reagan's classic line in the movie King's Row, "Where's the rest of me?" uttered after his
legs had been amputated by a vengeful physician.
111. E.g., CAL. Civ. CODE § 3333.2 (West Supp. 1985) (limit of $250,000 for noneconomic
losses); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-9.5-2-2 (Burns 1983) ($500,000 limitation on total recovery).
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amount recovered." 2 For example, given a limit of $250,000, juries faced
with cases in which plaintiff has relatively little pain and suffering may be
inclined to view the $250,000 limit as a target, thereby bringing general
damages up. The more egregious cases, when even the most dispassionate
observer might feel substantial general damages are justified, would still
be limited to $250,000 for pain and suffering. Thus, a problem is created
by any rule of law, be it court-made or statutory: the inability to adapt
to variations in circumstances."" Indeed, a cap on general damages arguably may be likened to those measures discussed earlier that arbitrarily
limit plaintiffs' right to recover for malpractice." 4 Given the inherent difficulty of placing any dollar value on pain and suffering," 5 however, a
statutory limit is probably no less arbitrary than a figure arrived at by a
jury, and probably far less disruptive. The measure is also justified by its
salutary effect on transaction costs, 1 6 the guidance it affords the jury,
112. Limitations on damages applicable only to medical malpractice cases are also prone
to attack on equal protection grounds. Courts in at least five states have found such provisions violative of equal protection guarantees under their respective state constitutions.
Wright v. Central DuPage Hosp. Ass'n, 63 Ill. 2d 313, 347 N.E.2d 736 (1976) (striking down
$500,000 limitation on all damages); Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125 (N.D. 1978)
($300,000 limitation on all damages); Baptist Hosp., Inc. v. Baber, 672 S.W.2d 296 (Tex.
App. 1984) ($500,000 limitation on all damages); Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 424 A.2d
825 (1980) ($250,000 limitation on 'non-economic' loss); Simon v. Saint Elizabeth Medical
Center, 3 Ohio Op. 3d 164, 355 N.E.2d 903 (1976) (dicta indicating invalidity of $200,000
limitation on general damages). In summarily dismissing an appeal from the California Supreme Court, however, the United States Supreme Court has recently held that California's
$250,000 cap on noneconomic damages is rationally related to legitimate state interests and,
therefore, denies neither due process nor equal protection under the United States Constitution. Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, 106 S. Ct. 214 (1985).
113. See Pokora v. Wabash Ry. Co., 292 U.S. 98 (1934), in which Justice Cardozo notes
the limitations inherent in rules of law.
114. See supra notes 84-93 and accompanying text. Wisconsin's patient's compensation
fund (which pays judgments or settlements to health care providers to the extent they exceed $200,000) is subject to a $500,000 limitation for damages (other than medical expenses)
whenever the amount of money in the fund falls below $2,500,000 in any one year or
$6,000,000 in any two consecutive years. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 655.27(6) (West 1980). By treating some December judgments differently than January judgments, this provision may be
viewed as arbitrary, and perhaps prone to an equal protection challenge.
115. Pain and suffering damages reveal their most serious lack of justification if one
considers the overriding objective of tort law to be a proper allocation of risks and
resources ....
Awarding compensation for pain and suffering almost certainly
produces economic distortions because it gives weight to a factor-pain-that has
no definite economic measure.
Peck, Compensationfor Pain: A Reappraisalin Light of New MedicalEvidence, 72 MICH.
L. Riv. 1355, 1374 (1974).
116. Transaction costs are reduced not so much at trial, although there might be slight
reductions in time spent proving and discussing damages, but by expediting the settlement
process because damages now become more predictable.
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cases,
and the predictability it lends to outcomes in medical malpractice
117
thereby aiding both underwriting and settlement of claims.
Structured Damages. Statutory provisions should allow for the
delayed payout of certain elements of damages. '8 Structured settlements
along these lines have long been used by parties who recognize that plaintiffs do not require all their damages at once, and that defendants may be
better able to pay large sums over an extended time period. 9 Courts
should take special care, however, in the structuring of damage awards.
Not all components of damages should be subject to long-term payout.
For example, damages representing expenditures already made for plaintiff's medical care should be paid immediately, perhaps with interest
added from the date incurred, to compensate the plaintiff fully and inhibit delaying tactics. Damages representing future medical expenses
might be payable over an extended period of time, and perhaps even adjustable (up or down) as facts develop.220 Obviously, courts should not
apply a discount to present value to damages that are to be paid in the
future. Finally, due to the delicate mathematics involved, the judge
should structure damages after the jury has rendered a verdict indicating
the amounts allocated to various categories of damages. Requiring the
jury to itemize damages by category also may have a salutary effect in
terms of jury control.
Note that modification of rules pertaining to damages is one reform
that need not be limited to the field of medical malpractice. In particular,
the arguments regarding limitations on general damages and structured
117. A similar limitation on special damages (i.e., plaintiff's out-of-pocket costs such as
medical care and lost wages) cannot be justified, as this element of damages is capable of
measurement, and the limitation on recovery would deny plaintiffs funds necessary to their
rehabilitation and/or maintenance. Such a limitation would result in dramatic secondary
costs (i.e., additional costs to society due to the failure to take effective cost-spreading measures). See G. CALABRESi, THE CosT OF AccIDENTs (1970). A limitation on total damages
could have the same effect by reducing special damages to an amount insufficient to care for
plaintiffs' needs. Such a limitation, nevertheless, has survived judicial scrutiny in at least
one state. Johnson v. Saint Vincent Hosp., Inc., 273 Ind. 374, 404 N.E.2d 585 (1980) (upholding $500,000 limitation on total recovery); but see Wright v. Central DuPage Hosp.
Ass'n, 63 111.2d 313, 347 N.E.2d 736 (1976).
118. E.g., CAL. Cry. PROC. CODE § 667.7 (West 1980) (providing for payment of future
damages in excess of $50,000 in periodic payments); Wis. STAT, ANN.§ 655.015 (West 1980)
(providing for future medical expenses in excess of $25,000 to be paid into a patient's compensation fund and disbursed as periodic payments for expenses); MoDzL PERiODIc PAYMENT OF JUDGMENTS ACT (1980).
119. See Krause, Structured Settlements for Tort Victims, 66 A.B.A.J. 1527 (1980).
120. Future adjustments do pose problems both in terms of transaction costs and the
desire for finality in litigation. Expedited procedures (perhaps arbitration) might be created
to address these problems. It might also be unfair to subject general damages to both a cap
and a delayed payout. A general damage limitation of $250,000, for example, should probably be subject to a requirement that all such damages be paid at the conclusion of trial.
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payouts apply with equal force to other tort actions.
Penalties for Frivolous Claims and Defenses
While some transaction costs of malpractice litigation are necessary
evils, those costs incurred due to frivolous claims and defenses, or due to
unreasonable delay should be deterred by taxing them to the responsible
party. Several jurisdictions already have in place statutory schemes imposing penalties for frivolous claims and defenses; 1 it would appear,
however, that the courts are rarely willing to impose such sanctions. The
presence of objective standards to determine whether a claim or defense
is frivolous might create a more effective deterrent to overly litigious parties. Objectively determined penalties for frivolous claims and defenses
(including unreasonable delay) can be linked to other reforms. For example, a party who proceeds to trial against the recommendation of a
screening panel may be required to pay the opposing party's attorney's
fees if the trial produces substantially the same result as the panel.12 2
A reasonable quid pro quo for the structuring of damages to produce a
delayed payout for damages not yet incurred (or for the more common
discount to present value of future damages) would be the payment of
prejudgment interest on damages incurred prior to trial.1 3 Defendants
should consider taking advantage of rule 68 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure (and its state rule counterparts) providing for offers of judgment, under which "if the judgment finally obtained by the offeree is not
more favorable than the offer, the offeree must pay the costs incurred
after the making of the offer." 2 All of the above devices should serve to
reduce the number of frivolous claims and defenses, promote settlement,
and avoid unnecessary delay.

121. E.g., COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 13-17-101 to -106 (Crim. Supp. 1984); see also FED. R. Crv.
P. 11 (imposing sanctions, including attorneys' fees, on litigants and attorneys responsible
for pleadings not filed in good faith).
122. See supra note 104 and accompanying text. Some commentators have suggested
that American courts adopt the English rule in which the loser pays the winner's attorney's
fees in all cases. See Epstein, supra note 8, at 135. While this proposal has some merit (and
might reduce the sting to deserving plaintiffs produced by the elimination of punitive damages), we should consider whether such a proposal would have a chilling effect on the bringing of good faith actions to test the boundaries of the law.
123. New Jersey has a rule providing that "the court shall, in tort actions.., include in
the judgment simple interest at 12% per annum on the amount of the award from the date
of the institution of the action or from a date 6 months after the date the cause of action
arises, whichever is later... " N.J. CouT RuLEs, 1969, R. 4: 42-11 (West 1985).
124. FED. R Civ. P. 68.
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Contracting Out of the Tort System

Parties to medical malpractice litigation need not rely on legislative intervention to fashion more rational and efficient remedies. Commentators
such as Professors Jeffrey O'Connell and Richard Epstein have drawn attention to the role that the contractual relationship between physician
and patient may play in tailoring the issues to be decided at trial or in
removing disputes from the trial process altogether.lss Unlike most tort
actions, which arise between strangers, the medical malpractice action
arises out of a contractual relationship between physician and patient.
This contract presents, in most instances, opportunities for the parties to
define clearly their relationship and respective duties, and the remedies
and procedures available in the event of breach.12 This Article discussed
above how the proper use of informed consent distinguishes the 'malpractice' case from the 'maloccurrence' case.1 7 The doctrine of informed consent obtains its life from the contractual nature of the relationship; contracts, in turn, are based on a meeting of the minds, a circumstance in
which communication plays a vital role.' 28 By fully informing their patients and reaching an explicit understanding about the medical treatment to be rendered and its limits, doctors have it within their control to
shape the parameters of professional liability claims.129
Professor Jeffrey O'Connell (long an advocate of no-fault plans) has
suggested that doctors and patients might voluntarily enter into contracts
125. See generally O'Connell, No-Fault Insurance for Injuries Arising from Medical
Treatment: A Proposal for Elective Coverage, 24 EMoRy L.J. 21 (1975); Epstein, supra
note 8.
126. In some limited instances (e.g., the hospital emergency room), the contract is no
more than implied, with little or no opportunity to negotiate enforceable changes in terms.
127. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
128. Doctors are not alone with respect to the need to establish better communications.
Many lawyers have left their clients in the dark regarding fee arrangements, prospects for
success, the time frame (and stress) caused by litigation, and the like. These communication
failures have strained relationships between lawyers and clients, adding to the burgeoning
load of legal malpractice litigation. See Gates, Lawyers' Malpractice: Some Recent Data
About a Growing Problem, 37 MzRCER L. REv. 559 (1986). To the extent lawyers fail to
consult with their clients, cases take on lives of their own, involving time and expenditures
well beyond those contemplated by the parties. The effect of this phenomenon on medical
malpractice litigation cannot be underestimated.
129. Informed consent also can play a role in the regulation of 'defensive' medicine. By
informing patients of the costs and purposes of contemplated tests, as well as the risks of
administering or foregoing such tests, doctors can eliminate the expense of tests that they
would consider unnecessary except for the specter of a malpractice suit. Of course, when
'defensive' medicine consists of the exercise of reasonable care to avoid malpractice liability,
it should be encouraged, not avoided.
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under which the patient foregoes her tort remedy in exchange for certain
recovery for injuries arising out of adverse results, regardless of the existence of fault on the part of the physician.130 Legislatures could lend support by enacting statutes declaring that such contracts are not unconscionable, provided that the contracts are entered into voluntarily and
contain certain conspicuous language. In fact, courts should not find these
contracts unconscionable because: (1) They need not be offered on a
take-it-or-leave-it basis, as most contracts of adhesion are, and (2) they
offer a quid pro quo, that is, in exchange for the waiver of the tort remedy, the patient is guaranteed compensation for injury (albeit at a re13 1
duced amount) on a no-fault basis.
B. Employment of Alternative Means of Dispute Resolution
The availability of alternative means of dispute resolution presents another means by which the parties to medical malpractice litigation may
engage in fair and expeditious resolution of their disputes without legislative intervention. Screening panels (established either by statute or by
private agreement of the parties) are but one such means of dispute resolution. 13 ' Mediation provides another means by which a disinterested
third party may help the disputants find some common ground.
The summary jury trial, pioneered by Judge Thomas D. Lambros of the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, has served
as a useful tool for the promotion of settlement by forcing the disputing
parties to come to terms with the likely resolution of the case.133 While
the summary jury trial has been employed primarily by the federal courts
in commercial disputes, its utilization to promote settlement of tort
claims should be explored by the state courts. Perhaps of greater value
with respect to such claims is the mini-trial. Like the summary jury trial,
the mini-trial consists of the presentation of each side's case in condensed
form. Unlike the summary jury trial, the mini-trial is usually conducted
privately and a single, neutral adviser is employed not to render a verdict,
130. O'Connell, supra note 125; see also O'Connell, Elective No-Fault by Contract-With or Without an Enabling Statute, 1975 U. ILL. L.F. 59.
131. Compare Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960), in
which a standard form, industry-wide adhesion contract providing for a limited warranty in
connection with the sale of an automobile was deemed unenforceable against the buyer. In
the court's words, the warranty's language "gave little and withdrew much." Id. at 388, 161
A.2d at 85.
132. See supra notes 98-106 and accompanying text.

133. T. LAMBROS,

THE SUMMARY JuRy TRIAL AND OTHER ALTNATE METHODS OF

Dis-

RESOLUTION (1984) (A Report to the Judicial Conference of the United States Committee on the Operation of the Jury System). Note that the summary jury trial, which requires
the intervention of the court, should not be considered a private dispute resolution
mechanism.
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but to consult with the parties regarding the likely outcome.'" The major
benefit of the mini-trial is that it forces both parties to view the opponent's case in the best light possible, as presented by skilled advocates
utilizing and summarizing all the best evidence at hand. It thereby creates an opportunity for the parties to disabuse themselves of unrealistic
expectations and arrive at a fair settlement.' s
Note that any one of the above private dispute resolution mechanisms
can be incorporated into a contractual agreement between physician and
patient at the outset of the relationship. Of course, none of these devices
is likely to prove successful if the parties maintain extreme, unrelenting
positions. The successful employment of alternative dispute resolution
techniques, therefore, may require some significant attitudinal changes,
which are the focus of the next section.
VI. AGREEING ON How To DISAGREE
Attitudinal changes will be necessary to promote a new climate of understanding and greater communication among the parties to disputes
concerning medical services. On the part of physicians, there must be a
realization that for all their training and status, they are also capable of
error. The defensive posturing of the medical profession (or, perhaps
more accurately, its leadership) inhibits rational legislative change, prevents amicable resolution of disputes, and, most seriously, frequently acts
as a barrier to communication between physician and patient. Indeed, it
is the failure of physicians to communicate adequately with their patients
that frequently leads to the alienation and misunderstanding that brings
about lawsuits.'8 s Doctors must realize that the malpractice problem is
134. See Green, Growth of the Mini-Trial,LriGaTION, Fall, 1982, at 12.
135. The private mini-trial has the additional advantage of not exposing the participants
to publicity, thereby protecting the physician at no cost to the patient (who also, for reasons
of her own, may prefer not to litigate in public). A major obstacle to the mini-trial (as well
as other private means of dispute resolution) is the fear (often unfounded) that the suggestion of alternative means of dispute resolution will be interpreted as a sign of weakness.
This problem is not inherent in a summary jury trial ordered by a judge, or in a compulsory
screening panel or arbitration system. Perhaps if a major malpractice insurer were to announce a general policy of employing mini-trials in all cases in which liability is unclear,
individual cases would not be stigmatized with the 'sign of weakness' that might attach to
the more selective use of the mini-trial.
136. Persons reporting ... negative [medical care] experiences were more likely to
report also that today's doctors maintained poor doctor-patient relationships. Major reasons given for the view that physicians have become less dedicated were
that they are too interested in money, that they are less accommodating and more
difficult to reach, and that they are more impersonal or inconsiderate ....
[TJhese data are ... consistent with the hypothesis that deteriorating and impersonal doctor-patient relationships contribute to the malpractice problem.
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due at least in part to malpractice, which, in turn, may be a manifestation
of a failure of communication.
For lawyers (particularly members of the plaintiffs' trial bar), there
must be a recognition that medicine, like law, is an inexact science. There
is in all professions a tendency to view the work of one's own profession
as difficult and subtle while that of other professions is seen as simple
and clear-cut. 37 Lawyers, as well as judges and juries, must realize that
not all bad results are attributable to malpractice, and that medical science has its limitations.
For patients, there is a need to recognize the limitations of medical
care, and the fact that the doctor also is a human being. Indeed, the resolution of problems in medical malpractice, as in other areas, proceeds
from a recognition of one another as human beings with needs and shortcomings. A major advantage of alternative means of dispute resolution is
the opportunity presented for solutions based on the respective needs of
the parties, as distinguished from solutions based on legal rights alone."'
The collateral source rule presents but one example. The fact that a
plaintiff may be legally entitled to recover damages without a reduction
Mechanic, Some Social Aspects of the Medical MalpracticeDilemma, 1975 DuKE L.J. 1179,
1184.
137. Compare e.g., Helling v. Carey, 83 Wash. 2d 514, 519 P.2d 981 (1974) with Hodges
v. Carter, 239 N.C. 517, 80 S.E.2d 144 (1954). Hodges was a legal malpractice action brought
against two attorneys who failed to properly serve process against plaintiff's fire insurers in
an earlier action. While defendants' manner of service in the underlying action had never
before been challenged, time had not yet expired to serve the insurers in an unquestionably
correct manner at the time the insurers filed motions to dismiss for want of proper service.
The state supreme court found defendants' manner of service improper (Hodges v. Home
Ins. Co., 233 N.C. 289, 63 S.E.2d 819 (1951)), and plaintiff, deprived of his action against the
insurers, sued his attorneys. The same court that had found service improper now held that
the defendant attorneys had not been negligent in "following a custom which had prevailed
in this State for two decades or more." Hodges v. Carter, 239 N.C. at 520, 80 S.E.2d at 146.
Juxtaposition of the Helling and Hodges decisions presents the irony of a Washington
court finding negligence (as a matter of law) on the part of an ophthalmologist who had
followed widespread practice, while a North Carolina court protects lawyers who, given ample notice that their adherence with custom had placed their client in jeopardy, pursued a
case to the state's highest court rather than taking simple steps to preserve their client's
claim. There are three possible explanations: (1) one case arose in Washington in 1974, the
other in North Carolina in 1954; (2) courts (composed of lawyers) view medicine as simple
and clear-cut, while law is seen as mystifying and difficult; or (3) lawyers protect their own.
138. These two considerations are not necessarily inconsistent. The law of damages, for
example, generally entitles a plaintiff who has established liability to recover what she needs
to become whole. Legal entitlements, however, need not dictate our result. While the parties
negotiate in the shadow of the law, they remain free to tailor their own solutions. This
emphasis on the parties' respective needs has been described elsewhere as focusing on interests, not positions. See R. FIsHER & W. URY, GETTING TO YEs: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT
WrrHotrr GIVING IN 41-47 (1981). This focus enables the parties to invent options for mutual
gain. Id. at 48-83.
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for contribution from collateral sources does not negate the fact that such
collateral sources, nevertheless, may reduce the plaintiff's actual needs. A
plaintiff, therefore, may be willing and able to forego some recovery in
exchange for the certainty of an out-of-court settlement with a doctor
who is willing to part with some money, but cannot afford to have her
reputation tarnished by trial. By addressing the mutually compatible
needs of the parties, a more satisfactory solution is obtained.'8 ' The shedding of defensive postures, then, can produce a result that is often more
palatable than that obtained through the trial process.
VII.

CONCLUSION

Charges and counter-charges by doctors' and lawyers' organizations regarding the existence of a medical malpractice crisis have created an atmosphere of recrimination that is hardly conducive to the development of
fair and rational solutions. Whether or not the specter of medical malpractice litigation has reached 'crisis' proportions, it is clear that
problems do exist. These problems are best addressed not by special interest legislation, which reduces the number and size of malpractice judgments without regard for patients' rights, but through legislative, judicial,
and private remedies tailored to counteract those forces that produce unfair or inaccurate results in medical malpractice litigation.
Doctors need not wait for legislative intervention to deal with the problem of malpractice litigation. Through better communication with patients, contract (and in particular, the principle of informed consent) can
be used to shape the doctor-patient relationship and eliminate problems
before they develop. Private means of dispute resolution can serve similar
ends. All of this requires better communication among doctors, lawyers,
and patients alike. It is a time for heightened human concern in place of
scapegoating and caricaturing. It is a time for lowered voices in place of
hyperbole. It is a time for more talk, and less rhetoric.

139. Structured settlements address similar goals. In this area the goals are the plaintiff's need for compensation (whether or not the doctor is actually at fault) and the defendant's financial need to stretch payout over a longer period of time. The zero-sum game is
avoided, and there is mutual benefit.

